Confronting a prolonged period of slow growth, Japan has recently faced a difficult policy environment, with large budget deficits apparently precluding the use of traditional fiscal stimulus, and zero short-term interest rates apparently precluding the use of traditional monetary stimulus. This paper reconsiders each of these conclusions. In earlier work (Auerbach and Obstfeld 2004a,b), we outlined the case for using monetary policy as an effective tool to stimulate growth, end deflation, and reduce the fiscal burden, even in a zerointerest rate environment. In this paper, we review our basic result and its logic, and consider how our argument is affected by the maturity structure of outstanding government debt and a banking sector that may itself hoard liquidity. We also discuss the issue of credibility, and how our conclusions square with recent Japanese policy experience. We then consider a fiscal policy alternative that has been proposed for Japan, to use variations in tax structure rather than in the level of taxation to stimulate growth in a liquidity trap. We find this policy wanting on both welfare and credibility grounds.
I. Introduction
Japan's efforts to stimulate its economy over the past decade have led to apparent macroeconomic policy paralysis, with short-term nominal interest rates at their floor of zero and fiscal expansion immobilized by fears of augmenting an already-huge public debt. In earlier work (Auerbach and Obstfeld 2004a,b) , we argued that open-market expansions of the money supply could be used effectively in such an environment, as long as (1) agents in the economy already expect that the liquidit y trap is not permanent; and (2) the monetary policy change is permanent and credible. The economic stimulus from such a policy would come through two channels, from a short-run increase in the inflation rate and a long-run reduction in the tax burden.
In this paper, we review our basic result and its logic, and consider how our argument is affected by the maturity structure of outstanding government debt and a banking sector that may itself hoard liquidity. We also discuss the issue of credibility, and how our conclusions square with recent Japanese policy experience. We then consider a fiscal policy alternative that has been proposed for Japan, to use variations in tax structure rather than in the level of taxation to stimulate growth in a liquidity trap. We find this policy wanting on both welfare and credibility grounds.
II. The Model and Basic Results
We consider a model in which the representative household maximizes lifetime utility of consumption (C t ) and labor (L t ) over dates t starting at t = 0, 
where β s is the pure discount factor between the end of period s − 1 and the end of period s.
(We assume throughout that β < 1 in the long run, so that the product ∏ = t s s 0 β converges to 0 as t→ ∞.) We use the dating conventions that consumption and labor occur at the end of the period, assets are indexed by their values at the beginning of the period, and prices are indexed by the end of the period. Throughout most of the analysis, and where not otherwise specified, we use a simplified version of the utility function,
Formally, the parameter k represents the disutility of labor, so that changes in k from one period to the next are taste shocks. However, as we will model production as a function of labor alone, variations in k will have the same impact as productivity shocks, altering the social cost of transforming forgone leisure into consumption.
There is no capital in the model, so the household holds its financial wealth exclusively in the form of money and interest-bearing government bonds. The household's real wealth at the beginning of period t (before payment of interest) is the sum of its holdings of debt (B) and money (M), divided by the contemporaneous price level (P):
We assume initially that all debt is of one-period duration and that money is issued directly by the central bank.
Wealth at the beginning of period t+1 is where i t is the nominal interest rate between periods t−1 and t, and w t , Ω t , T t , and C t are, respectively, the nominal and wage rate, nominal profits, real taxes and real consumption in period t. Combining these two equations and defining the real interest rate by r t ≡ (1 + i t )/(P t /P t−1 ) −1 yields an expression for the evolution of household wealth: To model money demand, we assume that households face a cash-in-advance constraint, needing to hold money in period t that is sufficient to purchase goods at the end of period t. Taxes are collected in the form of consumption taxes, and households are also required to hold cash in order to pay the taxes on their consumption purchases. If τ t is the consumption tax rate at date t, the cash-in-advance constraint, (2) M t ≥ (1+τ t )P t C t , is binding unless the nominal interest rate is zero, so that it is always the case that i t M t =i t (1+τ t )P t C t . Using this fact, we can rewrite the evolution of wealth as Maximizing utility subject to this budget constraint results in first-order conditions for consumption and labor at each date. Combining the conditions for consumption and labor at date t yields a solution for household consumption at date t,
in which an increase in the labor-disutility parameter, k, has the same impact as a decline in the real wage, discouraging work, consumption, and hence output.
Combining conditions for consumption at successive dates t and t+1 yields the standard Euler equation 
Note that the cash-in-advance constraint has the effect of replacing the interest rate between dates t and t+1 with the preceding period's interest rate.
We assume that consumption at each date is a composite good. A continuum of producers supplies the individual consumption goods under conditions of market power. We model nominal price stickiness by postulating that each producer must set a nominal price that is maintained over two periods. That is, a posted price is good for the period in which it is set and the following period, with all market demand supplied at that price (as long as price exceeds marginal cost). Price setting is staggered across the two classes of goods. Half of the goods, class 1, have their prices set in odd-numbered periods, while the other half, class 2, have their prices set in even periods. Goods within each type enter the utility function symmetrically, and all goods are produced subject to the simple production function Y = L. Letting c ti (z) be the type-z good in class i at date t, the relationship between the composite consumption good and underlying individual commodity consumption is:
That is, goods enter utility via a Cobb-Douglas function of the two class composites, each of which is a CES function of individual types of consumption. The corresponding producer price index is 2 / 1 2 2 / 1 1 t t t P P P = where
Now, let us consider the impact of open-market operations. It is clearest to do so first under the assumption that nominal goods prices are perfectly flexible, that is, are set for one period only. In that case, even though there are two sectors of the economy, monetary shocks have symmetric effects on the sectors' outputs, employments, and prices, and do not drive relative intersectoral prices away from unity.
Initially the cash-in-advance constraint (2) does not bind and the nominal interest rate i = 0, which can occur because expected money growth rates are low (and perhaps even negative) relative to the subjective discount rates reflected in the preference parameters β s . We assume, however, that some long-term interest rate is positive (as is currently true in Japan). As discussed in Auerbach and Obstfeld (2004a) , the only logical explanation for this upwardsloping term structure when the short-term interest rate is zero is an expectation of future positive short-term interest rates. Thus, we assume that on at least one date T in the future, i T > 0. We show that under flexible prices, monetary policy can affect the price level before date T, notwithstanding the economy's zero nominal interest rate. That is, any prospect of future nominal interest rates above zero, no matter how remote, implies that the economy cannot be in a monetary-policy trap beforehand. Indeed it suffices, once can show, that there be some future state of nature, occurring with any positive probability, in which i T > 0.
Start with the Euler equation (4) for date t, expressed in terms of nominal wages rather than prices based on the conditions (3) for the consumption-labor decisions at dates t and t+1. The result has the very simple form of an "inverse wage Euler equation, " 
We have assumed, however, that the economy is in a liquidity trap and the interest rate is zero from the present date, 0, through period T−1. At date T, the interest rate is positive and the cash-in-advance constraint is binding. To be concrete we will also assume that short-term the nominal interest rate also remains positive for all dates after T, but only some inessential details of our argument change if that is not the case. Under these assumptions, from (5), the wage rate for each date t < T−1 obeys the expression From (6), we observe that the wages (and prices) rise, fall or remain constant during the zerointerest regime according to whether the term
is greater than, less than or equal to 1.
For each period t > T−1, we have, from the original Euler equation (4) and the cash-inadvance constraint, (2),
From (5) and (6), the wage evolves from date T onward according to Thus, once we have an expression for w T-1 , (7) and (8) provide us with the entire path of wage rates both before date T−1 and after T−1.
To solve for w T-1 , write the Euler equation (3) . As a result, the general solution for the path of wages is (note that these two expressions are the same for t = T−1):
We can now see how a permanent step increase ∆M 0 in the money supply's level on date 0 will affect the economy. Let's assume that the increase in the money supply on date 0 does not change any future monetary growth rates M t+1 /M t , t ≥ 0. In that case, M T rises by the factor 1 + ∆M 0 /M 0 (as do all subsequent money-supply levels).
1 Equation (9a) and (9b) show that, notwithstanding zero nominal interest rates prior to date T, all future nominal wage rates, including those for dates 0 through T−1, will be scaled by the factor 1+∆M 0 /M 0 . As can be shown, with perfectly flexible product prices, monopolists charge a fixed percentage markup over the wage, so that P t = ρw t /(ρ − 1). Therefore, the current and all future price levels rise by the same percentage as do wages. During a period of zero short-term nominal interest rates, the price level's path is governed by the money stock expected for the first date on which interest rates turn positive.
The intuition is disarmingly simple. On the first date the short-term interest rate turns positive, the money stock determines the price level in the conventional way. As long as the interest rate is zero, however, prices move toward that conventionally determined value at a rate governed by consumers' rate of time preference. By raising the money stock permanently today, the monetary authority can shift upward the date-T terminal condition on the price level. That action necessarily also shifts upward the entire time profile of prices prior to date T.
Of course, one reason that markets might expect positive short-term interest rates in the future would be a government commitment to higher monetary growth rates then. Krugman (1998) and others have argued that such a commitment might be problematic. There are other mechanisms, however, that could produce zero interest rates now, coupled with expectations of future positive interest rates: predictable shifts in productivity growth, predictable shifts in time preference, or (outside the scope of the present model) demographic changes. To consider two concrete examples that might apply to Japan's current circumstances, an aging baby boom cohort with life-cycle savings behavior could induce a very high short-run saving rate that, in the context of our representative-agent model, would translate into a very low discount rate and a very high value for the discount factor, β. This would be particularly true if government promises of old-age pensions were viewed with some skepticism. A similar effect would occur if substantial pessimism or higher risk perceptions induced a rise in precautionary saving.
The welfare impact of a permanent money supply increase is easily expressed for the case of flexible prices. Consider a policy change, as measured by a policy index ξ. Let us assume for simplicity that the tax rate τ is always set so as to be constant over time and that the experiment ξ holds M t+1 /M t fixed in the future. Then, it may be shown (see Auerbach and Obstfeld 2004a ) that the money-metric change in welfare is:
The summation in (10) equals the present value of revenue, from taxes and seigniorage, plus monopoly profits -all of the sources of economic distortion in the economy -so the dollar value of the welfare effect equals that total times minus the percentage change in (1+τ).
III. The Sticky-Price Case and Simulation Results
Continuing to assume that wages are flexible, let us drop the temporary assumption that prices are flexible and consider staggered two-period setting of nominal product prices. From the assumption of profit maximization by producers and the household's Euler equation, we obtain the following expression for the price index for class-i goods, whose price is reset in period t : Note that this price level expression holds when wages, taxes and interest rates equal the values assumed by producers when prices are set. If we consider an unanticipated policy change at date t, then the prices set in period t-1 will not obey the above expression for P ti , ex post.
If the interest rate, tax rate, wage inflation rate, and discount factor are all constant over time, then the expression for P t simplifies to ( ) ( )
where µ is 1 plus the inflation rate. From this expression, it can be shown that the mark-up, P t /w t , is a decreasing function of µ for µβ < 1 and an increasing function for µβ > 1; that is, the mark-up is decreasing with inflation until the rate of inflation equals the pure rate of time preference. Since welfare is inversely related to the markup, this is therefore a model in which even anticipated deflation has welfare costs, and anticipated inflation has some beneficial welfare effects for sufficiently small inflation rates, consistent with the reasoning of Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry (1996) . 2 As discussed in Auerbach and Obstfeld (2004a) , there are three additional welfare effects of an open-market operation, relative to the flexible-price case. First, because consumption choices between the two sectors are distorted, output expansions generate a smaller welfare gain. Second, because prices are sticky, an unexpected increase in inflation (or decrease in deflation) compresses price-cost margins and therefore induces a Keynesian increase in output. Third, this change in the rate of inflation alters the inter-sectoral price distortion, which could either increase or decrease welfare. In order to consider the overall welfare impact of these factors as well as the initial welfare effect given in (10), we move to simulation analysis.
We simulate a model calibrated to the Japanese economy, in which the economy's presence in a liquidity trap is not assumed by the consequence of an equilibrium path. As one cannot determine ex ante whether the economy will be in a liquidity trap in a given period, the key to the methodology is identifying periods in which the economy is constrained. We accomplish this through the following backward solution technique.
Assume first that we know the state of the economy at date t+1, including whether the re is a liquidity trap (i.e., whether i t+1 = 0). Whether or not there is a liquidity trap in period t+1, we can solve for the wage in period t. If the cash-in-advance constraint binds at date t+1, then (from expression (9b))
If, instead, the cash-in-advance constraint does not bind at date t+1, then i t+1 = 0 and (from expression (6))
expressions (2) and (3). Together, they imply a notional solution for the period-t nominal interest rate:
If the solution for t i~ in (11) is negative, then the cash-in-advance constraint (2) is slack, with the real money stock greater than consumption expenditures. In this case, the interest rate is equal to zero, and the economy is in a liquidity trap, in that the current money supply is irrelevant.
3 Whether or not the economy is in a liquidity trap, we may then solve for the remainder of the date-t variables, and then proceed to a solution for date t-1. Finally, to begin the backward solution process, assume that, for some date in the distant future, we know that the economy has a positive interest rate.
The procedure outlined provides a solution for the entire path of the economy for give n paths of the policy variables M and τ. In order to ensure that the government's intertemporal budget constraint is satisfied, we iterate, revising the value of τ (which is assumed to be constant over time) with each iteration to meet the budget constraint. Once the iteration process converges, the value of τ to which behavior responds is consistent with the government 's budget constraint, given that behavior.
Note that a level shift in the money stock at the initial date, with no subsequent change in mo ney growth rates, will not affect the number of periods during which the liquidity trap applies. Consider first dates t from period T-1 onward, where T, once again, is the first date such that i T > 0. For these dates, the current wage is proportional to the next period's money stock. Thus, with no change in the money growth rate between t and t+1, the value of t i~ yielded by expression (11) does not change. Now, consider any date t before T-1, for which the wage is proportional to the wage at date T-1, and hence to the money stock at date T. From (11), there will be no impact of the value of t i~ at t if the growth of the money stock between periods t and T is unchanged.
It is useful to note that in this model the equilibrium is unique. Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe (2002) demonstrate that the zero-bound on nominal interest rates can generate multiple equilibria when the monetary authority follows a Taylor-like rule to set the interest rate. Our model escapes this problem because it does not include a feedback policy rule for the nominal interest rate. 4 It is easy to demonstrate, using the solution technique just described, that changing the terminal period has no impact on the equilibrium path. That is, suppose we first assume that the economy is permanently out of a liquidity trap as of date Ψ and solve backward from that date. If the assumption is consistent with this solution, i.e., if the path after Ψ exhibits positive interest rates, then starting the solution from any date Ψ′ > Ψ will yield the same equilibrium path for the economy.
We now turn to some numerical simulations. The theoretical model studied here has no government spending other than debt service. To remedy this omission in the simulatio ns, we add a stream of government purchases to the government's intertemporal budget constraint. Purchases at each date t are assumed to be exogenous and, like consumption at that date, proportional to the term 1/k t (see expression (3)). Thus, for a give n mark-up, interest rate and tax rate, government purchases will be a constant share of output and consumption over time. We adjust this share so that the tax rate in the initial equilibrium equals an estimate (see Auerbach and Obstfeld 2004a) for government 's share of output in Japan, 47 percent. We set the initial ratio of high-powered money to high-powered money plus debt at 0.2, also based on recent Japanese values. For each simulation, we consider the welfare effects of a change in monetary policy in terms of the equivalent variation in resources that would provide the same change in utility.
Because we are interested in studying an economy that is initially in a liquidity trap, we make parameter assumptions consistent with this being the case. Following the assumptions of the previous section, we let the pure rate of time preference initially be negative (-0.03), having it become positive (+0.02) in period 5. In terms of the discount factor itself, β initially is 1/0.97, falling to β 5 = β 6 = . . . = 1/1.02 in period 5. The low initial rate of time preference pushes the nominal interest rate lower, making a liquidity trap more likely. We also assume that the labor-disutility parameter, k, falls at an annual rate of .05, reaching 1.0 in period 5, when it ceases falling and remains constant thereafter. As discussed, variations in this parameter may be thought of in the same terms as variations in the rate of productivity, with falling k being equivalent to increasing productivity. If productivity is relatively low now but is expected to be higher in the future, then inflation will be lower to make room for the real balances needed to support higher income levels. 5 In line with recent estimates by Nishimura and Shirai (2000), we set the competition parameter, ρ, equal to 10, which induces a modest price-cost ratio of 10/9. Finally, in the initial equilibrium, we set the money stock to 1.0 in period 0 and assume that it grows at a constant annual rate of 2 percent thereafter. Figure 1 shows the initial equilibrium trajectory of the money stock, inflation rate, and nominal interest rate for the economy just described. Despite a growing money stock, the economy is in a liquidity trap in periods 0 through 4, with a zero nominal interest rate and prices falling at a rate just over 2 percent per year. The period-5 shift in preferences brings the economy out of the liquidity trap, with the interest rate rising to just over 4 percent and deflation ending. (Deflation lessens starting in period 4, due to firms ' forward-looking pricing policies.) Figure 2 shows the impact of one-time increases in the money stock effected by open-market operations in period 0. Recall that, in our model, this family of policies has no impact on the timing of the liquidity trap or the interest rate at any date. The figure shows the money stock and inflation trajectories under the baseline equilibrium already discussed, and alternative paths for period-0 increases in the money stock of 1 percent and 10 percent. The welfare gains from these policies are, respectively, 0.09 percent and 0.84 percent of output per year. The gain from a 10-percent increase in the money stock is sizable-nearly 1 percent of output. Such a jump in the money stock does cause some inflation-here nearly 3 percent per year for two years-but even this small temporary surge is an artifact of our assumption that prices adjust over two periods. In this model, a longer period of price adjustment, such as we model below, would yield a smaller spike and a more prolonged period of inflation within the liquidity trap regime. 6 Unlike a one-time, unannounced increase in the money stock, an unannounced change in the rate of money growth has the potential to bring the economy out of a liquidity trap immediately. Figure 3 illustrates this, presenting trajectories for the initial equilibrium and for an equilibrium in which the annual growth rate of money growth is raised from 2 percent per year to 4 percent per year through period 5. By the end of this transition period, the money stock is 12.4 percent higher than in the base case with 2 percent money growth.
With faster money growth, the liquidity trap ends immediately. Being out of the liquidity trap, the economy's inflation rate is dictated by this faster money growth rate, and exceeds that of the baseline equilibrium throughout the initial period. This inflation is still modestranging from less than 2 percent in period 5 to just below 3 percent in year 1. The welfare gain is 0.66 percent of output per year. Though still significant, this is well below the yearly gain that an immediate 12.4-percent increase in the money stock would deliver-1.01 percent of output. The gradual increase in the money stock weakens the welfare gain by pushing interest rates up immediately, lessening the short-run output surge that accompanies an unexpected burst of inflation.
7 This is illustrated in Figure 4 , which shows consumption trajectories for the baseline equilibrium, the equilibrium with faster money growth, and the equilibrium with an immediate jump in the money stock of the same size. Note that the temporary rise in consumption is much smaller under the policy of faster growth, and consumption actually then falls to near the baseline trajectory temporarily due to the higher no minal interest rate.
In summary, we have found that an unannounced, one-time open-market purchase of government debt can have large positive welfare effects, larger than the more gradual policy of increased money growth that would hasten the economy's departure from the liquidity trap. But how robust are these results to realistic complications, and how credible is such a policy?
IV. Adding Long-Term Bonds
The analysis so far has assumed that all government debt is of the one-period variety. In reality, of course, the government issues debt with a range of maturities. As discussed above, even when the government is currently in a liquidity trap, sufficiently long-term debt will carry a positive interest rate if the liquidity trap is expected to end at some date with positive probability.
Under our modeling assumption of certainty, long-term and short-term debt would be perfect substitutes from the perspective of investors; there would be no term premium and the longterm interest rate would be a simple function of the time path of short-term interest rates. For example, the value at the beginning of period t of a unit coupon payment at a subsequent date t+s would be:
where j t,s is the s+1-period interest rate at date t and i t+k is the one-period interest rate from the beginning to the end of period t+k.
Thus, along any equilibrium path, the composition of government debt is of no consequence. The effects of an unexpected policy change, however, would depend on the maturity structure of debt outstanding at the time of the policy announcement. Whereas one-period bonds' nominal value is unaffected by a change in the path of future short-term rates (because, by assumption, their coupons are reset each period), bonds of longer duration will experience nominal price changes in the opposite direction of changes in future short-term rates. This provides a second channel through which an open market monetary expansion can reduce the real value of government liabilities (money plus debt), in addition to that induced by a price level increase. For our base case considered above-an immediate money supply increase that is sustained permanently, with no change in money growth rates-this new channel will be absent, because short-term rates are unaffected by policy. For this type of policy, the initial maturity structure of debt is irrelevant. For a policy that increases money growth, on the other hand, there will be an increase in short-term interest rates and an immediate decline in the nominal value of outstanding long-term bonds, this reduction reinforcing the policy's welfare enhancing effects. As a consequence, the gap in welfare effects between the two types of monetary policy will be reduced by the presence of long-term bonds.
For example, consider again the numerical simulation of an increase in the money growth rate from 2 percent to 4 percent over the five-year period in which the liquidity trap prevailed in the initial equilibrium. We found that this policy would increase welfare by 0.66 percent of output per year, compared to a welfare increase of 1.01 percent if the ultimate change in the money stock had been effected immediately. Consider now the case in which a certain fraction of the initial debt is long-term, assumed for simplicity to be level-payment consols. For the same policy experiment of increased money growth, the welfare gain would increase to 0.78 percent if consols accounted for half of all initial debt, and 0.91 percent if all debt were long-term. In short, the difference between policies that increase the money stock immediately and those that do so over a few years is overstated by the assumption that all debt is short-term, because this assumption understates the wealth levy that occurs under a policy of gradual money growth.
V. Adding Financial Intermediaries
Until now, we have ignored the existence of financial intermediaries, assuming that the money stock equals the monetary base, and hence is directly controllable by the central bank.
With a banking sector, the ability of the central bank to increase the money stock depends on its success at getting the banking sector to translate increases in reserves into increases in the ultimate money stock, through lending. There has been concern in Japan, for example, that the Bank of Japan's increases in the monetary base have failed to have an expansionary impact because these increases have been absorbed by the banking sector in the form of excess reserves.
While such an accumulation of excess reserves would, indeed, cut off the salutary effects of the monetary expansion that we have discussed, one may show by the same logic used above that banks, like other agents in the private sector, should react immediately to a credible increase in the monetary base. Thus, a failure by banks to respond may reflect skepticism the central bank will carry through on its commitment to maintain its increase in the monetary base.
For simplicity of exposition, consider a bare-bones, deterministic model of intermediation in which banks hold the entire monetary base, and hold no excess reserves when the interest rate is positive. When the interest rate is zero, banks are indifferent between holding reserves and making loans, for the two assets yield the same short-term return, namely, zero. Let ν be the ratio of the monetary base to the money stock when there are no excess reserves, and let H t be the monetary base at date t. Then, at each date t, either i t > 0 and M t = H t /ν, or i t = 0 and M t ≤ H t /ν. In the latter case, M t is indeterminate, but it will have a lower bound at which further reductions in M t would induce a positive interest rate, which is inconsistent with M t < H t /ν.
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With this characterization of bank behavior, it is straightforward to show that the analysis changes little. Consider the backward solution algorithm used above, to determine whether the economy is in a liquidity trap in period t, given a solution for the interest rate in period t+1 and hence the wage rate in period t, w t . There, we used equation (11) to determine if the economy is in a liquidity trap. With a banking sector, we replace (11) with
to solve for the notional interest rate, t i~. Given the simplicity of the model and the fact that k is a parameter used for calibration, we can for ease of exposition and without loss of generality set ν = 1, i.e., (11″) 1 − =
t t t t H k w i
If t i~ > 0, then the economy is not in a liquidit y trap, i t = t i~, and hence M t = H t . If t i~ < 0, then the economy is in a liquidity trap and the money stock can be less than H t . But this lower money stock does not disturb the previous solution which assumed that M t = H t . Consider the next step in the solution process. Once i t has been determined, we solve for w t-1 . The solution for w t-1 depends on M t only if the economy is not in a liquidity trap in period t, in which case M t = H t . If the economy is in a liquidity trap in period t, then M t is irrelevant. Thus, the solution for w t-1 is not affected by the fact that M t can be less than H t (down to a lower bound of w t /k t ), and the same logic holds for each successive period in the backward solution process. It follows, then, that the solution for the path of i t , w t , and hence prices and output as well will be unaffected by whether banks may hold excess reserves in a liquidity trap. Of particular importance, the change in the equilibrium path of output, prices, wages and interest rates induced by a change in the path of high-powered money will also be unaffected by the ability of banks to hold excess reserves. And, though banks may hold excess reserves while the liquidity trap prevails, the lower bound on the money supply will still increase in response to a permanent increase in the monetary base.
For a sufficiently big monetary expansion, the new equilibrium would thus require some immediate expansion in the amount money supplied by the banks, notwithstanding the continuance of zero nominal interest rates.
Consider once again the simulation of an immediate, sustained 10 percent increase in the money stock, now with the added assumption that the government controls H rather than M and that M can be less than H if i = 0. Figure 5 shows that path of M and H for this experiment, with these two monetary aggregates no longer forced to be equal by assumption. For concreteness, we show the lower bound for M when the liquidity trap holds and the solution for M is indeterminate. We also show the interest rate, which is the same as in the previous simulation that held M = H and, as before, unaffected by this particular policy experiment. In the simulation, both before and after the policy change, the lower bound on the money stock gradually converges on H as the economy approaches the end of the liquidity trap. But this lower bound shifts upward with the change in policy, along with the high-powered money stock.
Why is the equilibrium unaffected by the introduction of banks? Because banks know that the liquidity trap will end in period T, and that they will cease to have excess reserves at that date, this ties down their behavior in earlier periods. When the money stock is increased permanently, this increases the money stock projected for period T, and the impact of this increase cascades back to the present, following the logic of our previous analysis. Of course, this conclusion requires that banks, as well as other agents in the economy, find the commitment to a sustained policy credible. If the banks believe the expansion of H to be temporary, then that policy will not induce an immediate increase in M.
VI. Credibility of Permanent Money-Supply Changes
Krugman's (1998) dynamic model of the liquidity trap relies on a belief among market actors that the central bank has a rigid future target for the money-supply level. Under that assumption, any announced future increase in the money supply's level lacks credibility and markets expect any current increase to be fully reversed later on. 9 Of course, were Krugman's assumption literally true in our model, the central bank would lose its ability to influence the economy today through open-market operations. How reasonable is this outcome in the context of our model? Krugman's (1998) rationale for assuming that markets believe in a given future money supply (or price level) rests on the credibility problem that inflation-averse central bankers would face in promising future inflation. In Krugman's sticky-price model, the liquidity trap poses a policy problem when full employment requires a fall in the (ex ante) real rate of interest. If the nominal interest rate is not already at zero, the central bank can stabilize by lowering that rate, a current policy action that does not depend on managing market expectations about the future. If the nominal interest rate is at zero, however, the only way to lower the real rate of interest is to convince markets that the price level will be higher next period than had previously been expected. Credibility is an issue because the authorities reap the benefit of higher promised prices today, but may be tempted to renege on their promise in the future when it comes time to create the expected inflation. Eggertsson (2003) has neatly formalized this type of credibility problem.
A. Credibility and Money-Supply Increases
Our model and simulations, suggest, however, that the preceding characterization of an inflation-averse central bank's credibility problem is unrealistically special and extreme. The associated fiscal benefits affect the credibility of a permanent money-supply increase. There is no welfare gain to reversing a permanent money-stock increase (or, equivalently in our setup, to reneging on a promise to raise the date-T money stock). On the contrary, such a move would have a negative welfare impact in our model compared to non-reversal. This finding is consistent with Eggertsson's (2003) observation that when national policymakers internalize the fiscal benefits of monetary expansion, permanent money-stock increases can become quite credible. Our detailed numerical results suggest, moreover, that for Japan the fiscal benefits are large enough to overwhelm any reasonable fears about inflation, especially starting from a position where prices actually are falling. In other words, the government's net debt is already so large that authorities should perceive very powerful fiscal incentives to end deflation. Following a monetary increase that leaves some public debt outstanding, the authorities' incentive is for more of the same, rather than a reversal. Eggertsson (2003) and others have argued, however, that an independent central banker's preferences might diverge from those of the government. In the extreme, the banker might have a lexicographic abhorrence of inflation, and thus be inclined to discount heavily or even ignore the associated benefits from public debt reduction, lower taxes, and higher output. Our model suggests, however, that even in this case, there still can be scope for significant monetary stimulus and debt reduction.
B. Credible Policy when Central Bankers Are Very Inflation Averse
Suppose that the central bank's inflation tolerance is not literally zero; instead, the central bank is willing to tolerate an inflation rate in the range [!ε,π] for some possibly small but positive ε, π. We also assume that, while the central bank has a lexicographic preference for keeping inflation in its target range, provided inflation is not out of range, the bank places some positive weight on at least partially fulfilling its promises by moving the money stock in the promised direction. That weight can be made arbitrarily small without affecting the conclusions below.
10 A final assumption is that is that along the economy's initial (preannouncement) path, inflation at date T (i.e., between dates T-1 and T), π 0 , is strictly below the central bank 's upper limit, π, and that the deflation rate at date 0 exceeds the bank's lower limit, ε.
To reduce defla tion occurring while the economy is in a liquidity trap, the central bank will wish to increase the money stock immediately and permanently, even if it places no weight at all on the additional benefits that this measure might produce for the economy. One possible equilibrium outcome following such an increase is that markets find this increase credible. As the resulting increase in inflation will play out over a relatively short period, the policy will succeed in reducing deflation around period 0 without increasing inflation around period T. In this equilibrium, the central bank brings the inflation trajectory within its target range, and the action also yields the fiscal and macroeconomic benefits to the economy discussed above.
But another potential outcome is that private agents will not find the announced permanent increase in money credible, in which case prices will not respond immediately, but only when the economy exits the liquidity trap at period T and the higher money stock affects prices directly. At that later date, however, the central bank may be forced to reverse its announced policy, if failing to do so leads to an inflation rate in excess of π. But, if inflation in period T, π 0 , is not already at the central bank's ceiling, π, then this second, Pareto-inferior equilibrium cannot exist. To understand why, consider first the simple case with flexible prices.
Assume that markets do not believe that the central bank will follow through with a permanent deviation from its pre-announcement money-supply path. Then wages and prices do not move prior to date T. On that date, however, the central bank has the option to increase the money supply permanently (relative to the baseline path) by a percentage x = π !π 0 without breaching its upper inflation target. Because the central bank will wish at least partially to fulfill its promise of a higher money supply at T, the private sector must rationally believe that at least an x-percent money supply increase is permanent. That belief implies, however, that the price level (and with it, the entire path of future prices) will rise by x percent immediately.
This immediate price increase, though, implies that people would be wrong to expect no further price increases. Inflation between dates T-1 and T is again π 0 < π, so there is room once more for some unexpected inflation between those dates if people do not believe that a further increase in the initial money stock is permanent. This raises the initial price level further, again making room for a bit more inflation between dates T-1 and T, and so on. By backward induction, the entire announced percent increase in the money stock on date 0 will be viewed as permanent under our central bank preference assumptions. In summary, the equilibrium in which the monetary expansion is no n-credible requires, with flexible prices, that inflation at period T be at least equal to the upper limit of the central bank's target range, π. But, as should be clear, and as we will now illustrate, the same logic applies even with staggered prices, as long as the inflation rate along the baseline path lies below π at date T and for the periods immediately following, during which any price increases induced by a monetary expansion at T might play out.
C. Credible Policy with Sticky Prices: An Example
For this analysis, we extend the numerical simulation model used above to allow for fouryear overlapping contracts, as seems to be needed to generate more realistic price persistence.
11 To illustrate concretely the previous theoretical discussion, we assume that the central bank's allowable target range for annual inflation is [-1 percent, 3 percent].
The two solid lines in Figure 6 show the economy's path with and without a permanent, fully credible, 10 percent money-stock increase on date 0. On the initial path, the economy in the liquidity trap experiences deflation outside the central bank's target range, perhaps because of some shock to the economy. Under the credible policy, the bank succeeds in bringing deflation belo w 1 percent, until the economy exits from the liquidity trap and follows the positive-inflation, baseline path. In this equilibrium, the central bank will not wish to reverse the policy, and indeed will be more than indifferent because it places some weight on following its announced policy, which also yields an annual welfare gain of nearly 1 percent of output.
To eliminate the possibility of an equilibrium with policy reversal, however, we must ask what would happen if people believed that the announced money-stock increase was to be reversed on date T = 5. The dotted line in Figure 6 shows the dynamics when the public does not believe that the money supply will be above the initial path at T = 5, but the central bank nonetheless increases the money supply permanently by 4 percent on date 0. In that case, inflation peaks (on date T = 8) at just 3 percent. Given the central-bank preferences assumed above, the public should therefore anticipate that at least 4 percent of the initially announced money-stock increase will indeed be permanent. That anticipation advances the resulting inflation in time, however, making room for further credible permanent monetary expansion on date T = 0. As argued above, backward induction leads to the solid policy path in Figure  7 -a credible 10 percent monetary expansion.
Our argument rests on the assumption that inflation is not already too high on date 5 and after. Otherwise, monetary expansion on date 5, no matter how small, would breach the 3-percent limit. That circumstance would indeed undermine current credibility. Thus, a very stringent upper limit on the central bank's inflation tolerance ultimately reduces its ability to fight deflation, for this stance takes away the bank's ability to adopt a credible increase in the money stock while the economy is in a liquidity trap.
D. Quantitative Easing in Japan
Starting in March 2001, the Bank of Japan initiated an explicit program of "quantitative easing" that has already expanded the monetary base, but with no discernible impacts on inflation or the nominal exchange rate (Shirakawa 2002) . The most dramatic yearly base increase, a log change of 24.3 percent, occurred in the year starting March 2001; in the following year the log base change was 12.8 percent, or about half as big as in the preceding year.
12 Is the Bank of Japan's seeming failure to ignite inflation evidence of deflationary expectations so entrenched that open-market policy cannot be effective? Not necessarily. The quantitative easing was not accompanied by a tax cut, as our analysis would recommend, and the absence of complementary fiscal policy has reduced the total potential expansionary effect. In addition, Japan's price level could well have fallen even more absent the monetary ease-the most recent period of base expansion has seen significant economic shocks, including the slowdown in the United States. There has also been apparent money-demand instability, including a substantial increase in currency demand, perhaps the result of financial-sector dis tress.
A possible upward shift in the demand function for money cannot be the full explanation for the apparent failure of quantitative easing, however. One notable feature of the recent Japanese experience, similar to what occurred in the United States during the 1930s, is that the evolution of broader monetary aggregates has not come near to matching that of the monetary base; instead, banks have chosen to vastly augment their excess reserves.
Our model suggests two potential explanations for the increase in excess reserves. One is that the bulk of the base expansion is not viewed by markets as permanent, in which case, in a liquidity trap, banks do not lend and the economy is unaffected. Figure 5 , however, suggests another possibility. The limited lending out of newly created reserves could simply reflect an expectation that the return of positive interest rates is quite distant. If date T is sufficiently remote in Figure 5 , the two cones of indeterminacy can overlap, creating the possibility that an infusion of monetary base stimulates the economy today, while still having little or no effect on the current broad money supply. In that case, the increase in broad money will begin before date T, but with some delay. If this latter explanation rather than the one based on credibility holds, one would have to attribute observed price and exchange rate behavior after March 2001 to strong unobserved deflationary pressures that were partially offset by quantitative easing.
It is also likely that the troubled state of Japan's financial institutions and of many potential borrowers helps to explain the reluctance of banks to lend. Financial-sector distress in Japan must be addressed aggressively and soon, as it is in any case a major impediment to Japanese recovery. Our analysis suggests that market anticipations of a healthy financial sector in the future can enhance the efficacy of current monetary expansion by creating expectations of a higher broadly-defined money stock; this makes financial restructuring all the more urgent.
Given the hesitancy of Bank of Japan policy in general and the retreat from the very strong quantitative easing in the year following March 2001, it is likely that imperfect credibility is part of the explanation for the slow price and exchange rate responses.
13 An important point of our analysis, however, is that in our analytical setting, imperfect credibility need not reside inherently in the objectives of inflation-averse central bankers. In the Japanese case, other forces seem to be at work, for example, concerns over the appearance of accommodating public deficits or worries that a return to positive interest rates might injure banks and worsen the public finances. Weakness of financial institutions and of corporate balance she ets no doubt is hampering the effectiveness of monetary transmission as well. Taxes have not been cut, contrary to the prescription in our model. Finally, as we have noted, it could well be that Japan's deflation in the past two years would have been harsher absent the Bank of Japan's quantitative easing. The Japanese economy's counterfactual path is not directly observable.
Another possibility suggested by our model is that the public expects very high inflation once short-term interest rates turn positive. As we noted above, that possibility might make it rational for people to expect a future reversal of current quantitative easing. The fact that the Bank of Japan has somehow managed to increase the monetary base by a large amount without seeming effect might make the possibility of high future inflation more plausible. Won't inflation skyrocket if ever the public comes to view past quantitative operations as permanent? High expected future inflation seems an unlikely hypothesis, however, in view of the rather low level of long-term nominal interest rates. In our model, the scope for some credible monetary expansion disappears only when expected future inflation is close to (and on at least one date equal to) the central bank's upper inflation limit.
To the extent that credibility has been a problem, the task of the Japanese authorities may be to persuade markets of the permane nce of past monetary expansions more than to carry out further expansions. One way to do so would be to complement monetary operations with the explicit and forceful announcement of a rising target price-level path, as recommended by several authors (see the discussions in Bernanke 2003 and Svensson 2003) . As our analysis 13 As Bernanke (2003, p. 7) , puts it, the "obvious reluctance on the part of the BOJ to sail into uncharted waters may have had the effect of muting the psychological impact of the non-standard actions it has taken." In that vein, the concluding remarks of Shirakawa (2002, p. 33) , who reviews the quantitative easing policy after one year, could be construed as tentatively declaring the policy a failure and arguing that the failure was to be expected on the basis of "standard theory." Although the Bank of Japan has had goal-as well as instrumentindependence since 1998 and has a statutory obligation to maintain "price stability," it has never defined its interpretation of that concept in quantitative terms. If the public believes the Bank views price stability narrowly as an inflation rate no greater than zero, then our analysis shows that the Bank indeed will lack the credibility to fight deflation. has shown, the Japanese government would add further stimulus and welfare gains by immediately implementing tax cuts consistent with the announced price-level path.
14 The experience of the United States during the Great Depression provides a perspective on Japan's effort at monetary stimulus. Between 1933 and 1940 , the stock of high-powered money in the U.S. nearly tripled. 15 It is noteworthy that after a spike in inflation due to the 1933 devaluation, the U.S. price level rose only gradually until 1941. As is likely in Japan today, monetary expansion had to offset the deflationary pressure caused by an output level well below full employment. Romer (1992) argues persuasively that this monetary expansion was, nonetheless, the main cause of U.S. recovery from the Depression, especially the sharp 1938-1942 increase in output (by 49 percent). If the experience of the Great Depression is any guide, Japan may need even more quantitative easing to combat its deflation. The simultaneous opportunity for public debt reduction provides strong additional motivation for this policy.
VII. A Fiscal Policy Alternative
Some commentators have expressed skepticism of monetary responses to Japan's plight. One concrete alternative, advanced by Martin Feldstein (2002) , calls for enacting an increasing rate of value-added tax, accompanied by a gradual cut in the income tax that renders the entire policy package revenue neutral at each point in time. The resulting intertemporal substitution effect, Feldstein argues, would restore positive inflation while stimulating consumption spend ing in the short run. Over the longer term, the policy would facilitate a transition from an income tax to a consumption tax, with further potential gains in economic efficiency. Thus, the policy would target both short-run stimulus and long-run tax reform, without increasing fiscal deficits or running the risk of money-supply overshooting. In the spirit of Feldstein's proposal, we consider the impact of a shift from a constant tax rate path to one with rates that are initially low, in the initial liquidity-trap regime, and rise over time to a constant, long-run level consistent with intertemporal budget balance. Table 1 presents results for four simulations, using the same parameter assumptions as before. Each panel presents the trajectories of four key variables for a particular simulation-the nominal interest rate (i), the inflation rate (π), aggregate consumption (C), and the tax rate, τ. Also shown for each simulation (other than the base case) is the welfare gain, measured as before. The first three panels represent simulations already presented graphically above, while the last is for a Feldstein-type proposal. Recall that both of the monetary polices increase welfare, although the money growth policy, which induces an earlier exit from the liquidity trap, does so by less.
The final panel in Table 1 gives results for a simulation in which the tax rate is set initially at a low level and then allowed to grow smoothly to its equilibrium level in period 5. As predicted, this spurs short-run consumption, much more than in any other simulation. But this increase in consumption is only temporary. In the long run, the consumption tax rate must rise to pay for the temporary tax cut, leading consumption to fall below its level in the base case. This long-run drop in consumption more than outweighs the short-run increase. The intuition for this result comes from the tax-smoothing literature, which indicates that, all else equal, consumption tax rates should be equal over time to minimize intertemporal distortions. Varying consumption tax rates is therefore welfare reducing. Indeed, because the short-run drop in consumption taxes (unlike the previously considered money stock increase) stimulates demand without compressing price-cost margins, this potential source of welfare gain is absent.
Interestingly, this policy of tax-based demand stimulus has no impact on nominal interest rates or the duration of the liquidity trap. This is because the policy increases the demand for goods, but not for money. Indeed, with logarithmic utility, expenditure on goods, (1+τ)PC, does not vary with the full price of goods, (1+τ)P (see expression 3). Hence, the demand for money, which equals expenditure, does not vary either, and there is no reduction in the excess supply of money. As shown in Auerbach and Obstfeld (2004b) , this invariance result breaks down when the intertemporal consumption elasticity is not equal to 1. But, for the empirically more likely case in which this elasticity is less than 1, it turns out that a policy to induce departure from the liquidity trap calls for tax rates to fall over time. Given that consumption demand is inelastic, the demand for money actually declines with a reduction in the tax rate, so a short-run increase in money demand requires a tax rate that is initially higher. Note, too, that, in both policy experiments, the tax-rate variation -whether rising or fallingreduces welfare. As the results for monetary policy illustrate, escaping the liquidity trap, in itself, should not be a fundamental policy objective, if salutary policies remain available in the presence of very low interest rates. Tax rate variation may succeed in eliminating the liquidity trap, but the underlying policy justification remains weak.
As credibility is a key requirement for monetary policy effectiveness, one might ask whether alternative polices, such as tax rate variations, are more attractive in this regard. In particular, will it be easier for a government to maintain a commitment to raise tax rates over time than to maintain an increase in the money supply? We would argue, to the contrary, that the tax policy will be more difficult to maintain. The government would forgo seigniorage it has already captured by reversing an open market operation purchase of bonds; it has every incentive not to do so, even if the economy's response to its policy is delayed. On the other hand, a government that has promised to raise consumption taxes, if confronted by an initial lack of economic response, may find it difficult to adhere to such a promise in the face of continued weakness in consumption demand. Thus, the monetary policy approach remains preferred.
VIII. Summary and Conclusion
We have confirmed the intuition that a substantial monetary expansion undertaken in a liquidity trap should improve welfare by reducing the taxes required in the future to service the national debt. This, in itself, is an important finding, for it suggests a role for monetary policy even if the policy has no immediate impact on prices, output or interest rates. But we have also shown that this policy can effect an immediate expansion in prices and, with less than fully flexible prices, output as well. Thus, monetary policy remains an important policy instrument for an economy mired in a liquid ity trap, even if the liquidity trap is severe and expected to last a long time. A fiscal policy alternative, though, based on time-varying tax rates, offers less appeal, on both welfare and credibility grounds.
Entrenched price expectations surely are a barrier to policy success in Japan. In view of the large economic benefits available, however, sustained policy action coupled with better communication of strategy to the public should be able to modify the deflationary psychology. 
